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CONSTITUTIONAL TORT REFORM
Mark Geistfeld*
Twentieth century developments in tort law can be roughly
described as having involved either the expansion or the contraction
of liability. As the century progressed, the scope of tort liability
expanded dramatically and tort law became increasingly friendly to
plaintiffs.' By the close of the century, the scope of liability was
being significantly curtailed as tort law developed in a manner more
favorable to defendants.
2
A dynamic of pro-plaintiff expansion or pro-defendant
contraction no longer adequately describes the process of tort reform.
* Crystal Eastman Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
I gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments I received from Sam
Issacharoff, Cathy Sharkey and Ben Zipursky.
1. As Lawrence Friedman explains:
In essence, nineteenth-century tort law was a law of limitation: a law
that set boundaries to the liability of enterprise; a law that made it
difficult ... to collect for personal injury. In the twentieth century, the
old tort system was completely dismantled; the courts and the
legislatures limited or removed the obstacles that stood in the way of
plaintiffs; and a new body of law developed, law which favored the
plaintiffs-to the point where people spoke about a liability
"explosion." Some of the changes were slow and incremental; some
were dramatic. Some were inventions of judges; some were embodied
in complicated statutes.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 349-
50 (2002).
2. The reforms that state legislatures enacted during the 1980s routinely
restricted liability, such as by imposing caps on damages and limiting joint and
several liability. See Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races "': The
1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REv. 207, 218-23
(1990) (providing charts summarizing state tort law reforms). For studies
concluding that changed judicial attitudes were partially responsible for the
pro-defendant trend that emerged during the 1980s, see Theodore Eisenberg &
James A. Henderson, Jr., The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An
Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990); Theodore
Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 731 (1992).
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In a line of relatively recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has held
that a tort award of punitive damages must satisfy the procedural and
substantive requirements of the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 3  These requirements have significantly reformed
punitive damages practice. So far, constitutional tort reform has
been limited to punitive damages, but Part I explains why such
reform is not necessarily limited to this area of tort law. Other
important tort practices raise the same sort of due process concerns
that the Court has relied upon to justify the constitutional tort reform
of punitive damages practice. The Court's punitive damages
jurisprudence may thus provide the foundation for a new type of
broad-based tort reform.
Regardless of what one may think about the Court's foray into
tort reform, constitutional tort reform has desirable characteristics.
Rather than addressing the substantive aims of tort liability,
constitutional tort reform is supposed to reduce or eliminate any
unreasonable legal uncertainty generated by the tort practice in
question. But as Part II explains, the neat distinction between
substance and process cannot be attained in practice. Any reform
designed to reduce legal uncertainty will depend upon a contestable
conception of tort liability, a characteristic of constitutional tort
reform clearly present in the Court's punitive damages jurisprudence.
The Court, though, does not have to reach the correct substantive
outcome in order to make constitutional tort reform desirable. If the
Court adopts a reform that depends upon the wrong substantive
conception of tort law, the states retain the power to adopt a different
substantive objective for the tort practice. Constitutional tort reform
therefore can serve the valuable role of forcing state courts and
legislatures to identify more clearly the substantive objectives of tort
law, an issue of critical importance that has not been adequately
addressed by the reform movements of the last century.
3. In 1989, the Court left open the question of "whether due process acts
as a check on undue jury discretion to award punitive damages in the absence
of any express statutory limit." Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 277 (1989). A decisive, affirmative answer to that question
was provided by the Court a few years later in BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559 (1996).
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I. THE DUE PROCESS CONSTRAINTS ON THE TORT SYSTEM ARE NOT
LIMITED TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In its most recent case addressing the constitutionality of a
punitive damages award, the Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell identified four different constitutional
"concerns" that justify constraining those awards as a matter of due
process.4 None of these concerns are unique to punitive damages,
implying that due process also constrains any other tort practice
implicating the same set of concerns.
A. The First Constitutional Concern: The Nature of
the Defendant's Interests
Under Mathews v. Eldridge, the "specific dictates of due
process" depend upon three factors, including "the private interest
that will be affected by the official action." 5 Consistent with this
test, the Court's first constitutional concern with punitive damages
addresses the nature of the defendant's interests:
Although these awards serve the same purposes as criminal
penalties, defendants subjected to punitive damages in civil
cases have not been accorded the protections applicable in a
criminal proceeding. This increases our concerns over the
imprecise manner in which punitive damages systems are
administered.6
A defendant's private interest in liberty is at stake in a criminal
prosecution. This justifies procedural safeguards that are more
demanding than those required for civil actions, which impose
monetary liability on the defendant. By concluding that punitive
damages "serve the same purposes as criminal penalties," the Court
apparently can justify procedural safeguards for punitive damages
that would seem to be more demanding than the safeguards required
for other forms of tort liability. A similarity of purpose implies that
punitive damages and criminal liability implicate similar interests of
the defendant, thereby requiring similar procedural safeguards for the
analogous forms of liability.
4. 538 U.S. 408, 417-18 (2003).
5. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
6. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417.
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The Court bases this constitutional concern entirely on the fact
that both criminal penalties and punitive damages "are aimed at
deterrence and retribution." 7 The Court clearly assumes that criminal
law and tort law identically interpret the purposes of deterrence and
retribution. Upon scrutiny, the assumption is unwarranted. Criminal
penalties can further aims of deterrence and retribution that are
fundamentally different than those furthered by punitive damages.
"The broad aim of the criminal law is, of course, to prevent
harm to society.... This it accomplishes by punishing those who
have done harm and by threatening with punishment those who
would do harm, to others." 8  Criminal liability punishes the
defendant for the wrong suffered by the public.9 So too, criminal
penalties are formulated to deter members of the public from
committing crimes-a purpose commonly called "general
deterrence."' 0
Unlike the criminal law, tort law is based upon individual rights
and a corresponding set of individual duties.'' Due to this individual
right-duty nexus, tort law can tailor punitive damages to punish the
defendant duty-holder for the way in which she violated the
plaintiffs right, while also deterring the defendant from violating the
7. Id. at 416.
8. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2(e) (2d ed.
2003).
9. See, e.g., 21 AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 474 (1998) (stating that "a
crime is by definition a public wrong, one against all people of the state"). For
a good discussion on the importance of limiting criminal liability to public
punishment rather than private punishment, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC
CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 35-40 (1998).
10. General deterrence is "the tendency of people who have not yet been
sanctioned to be deterred by the prospect of sanctions for committing an illegal
act." STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 515
(2004). Criminal liability necessarily involves general deterrence, because
criminal penalties must be set prospectively for any given category or class of
conduct. See LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 1.2(d) (describing necessity of
prescribed criminal penalties).
11. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928)
(holding that a tort plaintiff can recover only by showing that the defendant's
breach of duty constitutes a "'wrong' to herself, i.e., a violation of her own
right, and not merely a wrong to someone else, nor conduct 'wrongful' because
unsocial").
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plaintiffs right in the future-a purpose commonly called
"individual or specific deterrence."'
12
Thus, criminal liability and punitive damages can each serve the
aims of punishment and deterrence without sharing a similarity of
purpose, contrary to what the Court has assumed. Criminal liability
provides retribution for public wrongs and the necessary incentives
for general deterrence, whereas punitive damages can provide
retribution for private wrongs and the necessary incentives for
individual deterrence.
To illustrate this difference, consider a case involving a
defendant who repeatedly drove her truck over the plaintiffs land in
order to reduce considerably the travel distance between the
defendant's property and her desired destination. Each trespass did
not otherwise damage the land, so the defendant knew she would
only have to pay nominal damages to the plaintiff landowner as
compensation for each trespass. Reasoning that the nominal
damages for trespass are less costly than the added travel time
otherwise required for the trip, the defendant decided to commit
trespass on an ongoing basis. The defendant's behavior warrants
punitive damages. By behaving in this manner, the defendant has
tried to convert the plaintiffs right to exclusive possession of the
land into an easement without obtaining the requisite consent from
the plaintiff. As the defendant's behavior reveals, the plaintiff's right
to exclusive possession cannot be adequately protected by
compensatory damages. Protection of the right requires punitive
damages. This extra-compensatory damages award punishes the
defendant for not previously respecting the plaintiff's right to
exclusive possession, while further protecting the right by giving the
defendant an incentive not to trespass in the future. The punitive
damages award is tailored to protect the plaintiff's right and nothing
else. In effect, these damages force the defendant to stay off the
property or otherwise obtain the plaintiff's consent for the easement,
12. "[T]he notion of individual deterrence (sometimes called particular
deterrence or special deterrence) ... is the tendency of a person who has been
penalized for committing an illegal act to be more deterred from in the future
from committing that act than he had been beforehand by the prospect of
sanctions." SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 515 (sentence structure omitted).
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the result required by the plaintiffs right to exclusive possession of
the land.
Punitive damages therefore can be justified exclusively as a
means of protecting the plaintiff's individual tort right from wrongful
infringements by the defendant, just as other forms of tort liability
can be justified as a means of protecting the plaintiffs tort right.
13
Like any form of tort liability, punitive damages can be formulated to
redress a private wrong fundamentally different than the public
wrongs of concern to the criminal law.
To be sure, the trespassing defendant may also be subject to
criminal liability, but that possibility provides another reason for
concluding that punitive damages are not a criminal sanction. After
all, if punitive damages were a criminal penalty for the trespass, then
imposing criminal liability on the defendant for the same trespass
would involve double punishment. In addressing this issue, the
majority of courts have "avoided the double jeopardy problem by
holding that punitive damages are punishment, not for the improper
act in the abstract, or the wrong that the defendant has caused to
society, but for the legal wrong to the individual plaintiff."'
14
The Iowa Supreme Court, for example, concluded that
the clear weight of authority is... that the damages allowed
in a civil case by way of punishment, have no necessary
relation to the penalty incurred for the wrong done to the
public: but are called punitive damages by way of
distinction from pecuniary damages, and to characterize
them as a punishment for the wrong done to the individual.
In this view, the awarding of punitive damages can in no
just sense be said to be in conflict with the constitutional or
common law inhibition against inflicting two punishments
for the same offense.15
13. The important tort doctrines can all find justification in terms of the
individual right to physical security. See Mark Geistfeld, Negligence,
Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 585 (2003).
14. Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive
Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV.
583, 622 (2003).
15. Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379, 391 (1866).
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Hence the mere fact that punitive damages serve the purpose of
retribution and deterrence does not necessarily turn these damages
into a form of criminal liability, a conclusion with ample historical
and contemporary support. 16 Retribution and deterrence can have
different meanings in tort law and criminal law, contrary to the
Court's assumption that these two purposes are shared by the two
bodies of law.
Indeed, the Court has implicitly recognized as much, which
should come as no surprise given that the Court's punitive damages
jurisprudence relies upon tort practice.17 In State Farm, for example,
the Court concluded that the amount of a punitive damages award
cannot be justified on the ground that the "harm to the individual is
minor but massive in the aggregate"' 8  By holding that the
punishment meted out by a punitive damages award cannot be
justified by the aggregate harm suffered by the public, the Court has
effectively recognized that punitive damages must punish private
wrongs ("harm to the individual") and not the public
wrong addressed by criminal liability ("harm... massive in the
aggregate").
This conclusion is fully consistent with the Court's recognition
that a punitive damages award for an individual right-holder can be
based upon harms that the defendant's course of conduct has
inflicted upon similarly situated right-holders.' 9  Under certain
conditions, tort law can only protect the individual right by
considering the duty-holder's behavior towards the relevant group of
right-holders. For example, the manufacturer of a mass-marketed
product owes an individual duty to each consumer of its product, but
does not give individualized treatment to each one. The
16. For an excellent discussion and thorough analysis of the historical
issues, see generally Colby, supra note 14. For a contemporary example, see,
e.g., Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 113 Cal. App. 4th 738, 746-47 (2003) ("There
is a fundamental difference between parking fines and drug forfeitures, on the
one hand, and punitive damages on the other. In the case of punitive damages,
the exaction arises from a 'private' wrong: if there is no wrong resulting in
compensable injury to this plaintiff, there can be no exaction of punitive
damages.").
17. Cf infra Part II (explaining why constitutional tort reform adopts the
substantive conception of tort liability expressed by the existing tort practice).
18. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003).
19. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572-74 (1996).
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manufacturer instead treats each individual consumer as being a
member of a group (those individuals whose aggregate demand
determines the most profitable characteristics of the product). Under
these conditions, a punitive damages award can adequately protect
the individual right held by a particular consumer only if based upon
the manufacturer's behavior towards the group of consumers.
The concept of individual deterrence also explains the Court's
holding that due process requires a reasonable ratio between the
actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive
damages award, so "that, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-
digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a
significant degree, will satisfy due process." 2°  As a matter of
individual deterrence, a presumptive ratio between the plaintiffs
harm and the punitive damages award makes sense. Ordinarily, a
defendant who must pay some single-digit multiple of damages to
the plaintiff presumably has a sufficient incentive to avoid future
violations of the plaintiffs right. The ratio is presumptive, because
in some cases, like those involving low compensatory damages (as in
the trespass example) or the potential for large losses, punitive
damages must be increased in order to eliminate the benefit the
defendant had expected to derive from violating the plaintiffs right.
In these circumstances, the Court has allowed for departures from the
presumptive single-digit ratio between compensatory and punitive
damages.
2 1
As a matter of general deterrence, the presumptive ratio is hard
to defend. General deterrence depends upon the likelihood that any
given wrongdoer within the relevant population will be caught and
sanctioned. A wrongdoer who faces a 1 in 50,000 chance of being
caught and sanctioned, for example, must pay punitive damages
approximately 50,000 times the compensatory award in order to have
a sufficient incentive to act lawfully.22 This exact justification for a
20. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
21. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993)
(upholding a punitive damages award of $10 million in a case involving
$19,000 of compensatory damages because the relevant disparity involved the
potential loss to the right-holder that could have occurred if the defendant had
fully succeeded in its wrongful scheme).
22. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW
161-62 (1987).
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punitive damages award was proffered by the plaintiffs in State Farm
and rejected by the Court the ground that it "ha[s] little to do with the
actual harm sustained by [plaintiffs]. 23  By expressly rejecting a
general deterrence rationale for a punitive damages award, this
passage further illustrates how the Court has conceptualized punitive
damages as a method for redressing private wrongs.
As shown by the Court's jurisprudence on punitive damages,
these awards can serve the purposes of punishing the defendant for
the private wrongs suffered by the plaintiff while supplying the
amount of individual deterrence necessary to protect the plaintiffs
right from infringements by the defendant. Punitive damages clearly
serve the aims of punishment and deterrence, but these aims can
fundamentally differ from the purposes of criminal liability based
upon the punishment of public wrongs and general deterrence.
Contrary to what the Court has assumed, the objectives of
punishment and deterrence do not necessarily make punitive
damages analogous to criminal liability for purposes of due process.
The analogy must come from somewhere else.
Under the Mathews test, the due process inquiry depends upon
the nature of the defendant's interests implicated by the form of
liability.24 The Court therefore could draw a defensible due process
analogy between punitive damages and criminal liability if each form
of liability implicates the same private interests of the defendant.
When formulated in this manner, the due process inquiry shows that
any constitutional concern generated by punitive damages is also
generated by other tort practices.
Criminal liability involves the restriction of the defendant's
liberty interest, either directly by confinement or indirectly by the
imposition of monetary fines. Tort law also directly restricts the
defendant's liberty interest by imposing behavioral requirements on
the defendant as duty-holder. The negligence standard of reasonable
care, for example, requires certain conduct on the part of the duty-
holder with respect to particular forms of risky behavior. Insofar as
the direct restriction of the defendant's liberty interest creates a
special due process concern as it does in the criminal context, that
23. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 427.
24. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1978).
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constitutional concern applies to the duty of care governing
negligence liability.
25
To be sure, one might conclude that the underlying tort right
does not directly restrict the defendant's liberty interest, since it is
the imposition of punitive damages that ultimately gives the
defendant an incentive to behave in the manner required by the right.
So conceptualized, punitive damages still implicate an individual
interest that is not fundamentally different than the interest
implicated by other forms of tort liability. Ordinarily, the threat of
liability for compensatory damages also gives the defendant an
incentive to behave in the manner required by the standard of care.26
Insofar as the incentive effects of a damages award provide the direct
restriction of the defendant's liberty interest, there is no fundamental
difference between punitive damages and compensatory damages.
The equivalency of interests becomes even more apparent once
we recognize that criminal liability can also involve monetary fines,
which are an indirect restriction of the defendant's liberty interest. In
this respect, both criminal liability and punitive damages involve the
same interest of the defendant. But the defendant's private interest
pertaining to money is also implicated by any form of tort liability
requiring the payment of compensatory damages. Once again, any
due process concern posed by punitive damages also applies to other
forms of tort liability.
27
By concluding that the nature of the defendant's private interests
creates a due process concern regarding punitive damages, the Court
has invoked a constitutional concern that is not limited to punitive
damages. The nature of the defendant's private interests that are
25. Cf Geier v. Am. Honda Corp., 529 U.S. 861, 881 (2000) (holding that
state tort rules requiring airbags in automobiles are preempted because the tort
duty "would have presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of devices that
the federal regulation sought").
26. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 127-28.
27. One could also argue that punitive damages implicate different private
interests than those discussed in text because "there is a stigma attached to an
award of punitive damages that does not accompany a purely compensatory
award." Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 54 (O'Conner, J.,
dissenting). But stigma can also attach to a compensatory award based on the
nature of the tortious conduct. Negligent behavior can be morally
blameworthy, as are many of the intentional torts such as the intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
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implicated by punitive damages are also implicated by other forms of
tort liability. The constitutional concern the Court has identified
with respect to punitive damages implies that other tort practices also
raise constitutional concerns, unless there is some other
constitutional difference between these forms of tort liability.
B. The Second Constitutional Concern: Arbitrary
Deprivation of Property
Due process protects the defendant from arbitrary or
unreasonable deprivations of property, so the Court in State Farm
could also invoke this constitutional concern in justifying a due
process constraint on the award of punitive damages:
We have admonished that "[p]unitive damages pose an
acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property. Jury
instructions typically leave the jury with wide discretion in
choosing amounts, and the presentation of evidence of a
defendant's net worth creates the potential that juries will
use their verdicts to express biases against big businesses,
particularly those without strong local presences.
'" 28
The concern that open-ended jury instructions can result in
arbitrary or unreasonable deprivations of property is sufficient to
justify a due process constraint, but that concern is not limited to
punitive damages. Jury instructions regarding other forms of tort
liability are equally vague, if not more so.
Consider, for example, California jury instructions regarding
negligence liability:
Negligence And Ordinary Care-Definitions
Negligence is the doing of something which a
reasonably prudent person would not do, or the failure to do
something which a reasonably prudent person would do,
under circumstances similar to those shown by the
evidence.
It is the failure to use ordinary or reasonable care.
Ordinary or reasonable care is that care which persons of
ordinary prudence would use in order to avoid injury to
28. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003)
(quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994)).
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themselves or others under circumstances similar to those
shown by the evidence.
[You will note that the person whose conduct we set up
as a standard is not the extraordinarily cautious individual,
nor the exceptionally skillful one, but a person of
reasonable and ordinary prudence.]
29
The jury is also instructed that a "test" for determining
negligence is whether the risk was foreseeable and "if the action or
inaction reasonably could have been avoided., 30 The jury is then
instructed that the amount of reasonable care "varies" with the
circumstances. 31 Dangerous activities require "extreme caution.
3 2
Finally, the jury is told that the defendant's conformity or lack of
conformity to custom is relevant, but negligence ultimately depends
on whether the defendant exercised reasonable care.
33
These instructions give the jury an amount of discretion that is
not significantly different than the discretion given by instructions on
punitive damages. The jury is told that the amount of reasonable
care depends upon considerations of foreseeability and risk, just as it
is told that the amount of punitive damages depends upon
considerations of retribution and deterrence. The jury, however, is
not otherwise told how to formulate the requirements of reasonable
care in terms of foreseeability and risk, just as it is not otherwise told
how to formulate a punitive damages award in terms of retribution
and deterrence. Jury instructions regarding the requirements of
reasonable care give jurors at least as much discretion as they have in
determining an award of punitive damages.
Like the determination of punitive damages, the determination
of reasonable care is a mixed question of law and fact.34  For
29. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, 3.10 (2004) [hereinafter
BAJI].
30. Id. 3.11.
31. Id. 3.12.
32. Id. 3.41.
33. Id. 3.16.
34. "[T]he function of the jury in fixing the standard of reasonable conduct
is so closely related to law that it amounts to a mere filling in of the details of
the legal standard." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS § 37, at 238 (5th ed. 1984). This "filling in of the details" involves
more than the resolution of disputed facts as applied to a well-specified
1104
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constitutional purposes, the jury plays the same role for both types of
liability, which further supports the conclusion that any
constitutional concern generated by punitive damages should also be
generated by ordinary negligence liability.
35
Any concerns the Court has expressed about the "wide
discretion" afforded to juries is not limited to the issue of reasonable
care. The jury may have even more discretion in determining
compensatory damages for pain and suffering. Again, the jury
instructions in California are illustrative:
Measure Of Damages-Personal Injury-Pain And
Suffering
Reasonable compensation for any pain, discomfort,
fears, anxiety and other mental and emotional distress
suffered by the plaintiff and caused by the injury [and for
similar suffering reasonably certain to be experienced in the
future from the same cause].
No definite standard [or method of calculation] is
prescribed by law by which to fix reasonable compensation
for pain and suffering. Nor is the opinion of any witness
required as to the amount of such reasonable compensation.
[Furthermore, the argument of counsel as to the amount of
damages is not evidence of reasonable compensation.] In
making an award for pain and suffering you should exercise
your authority with calm and reasonable judgment and the
standard of care. Even if there are no facts in dispute, the jury still determines
the requirements of reasonable care. See Mark P. Gergen, The Jury's Role in
Deciding Normative Issues in the American Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 407, 434 n. 121 (1999). The jury therefore makes some sort of normative
decision regarding the requirements of reasonable care, a decision similar to
the one juries make with respect to punitive damages. See Cooper Indus., Inc.
v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 437 (2001) (holding that the
jury determination of punitive damages does not constitute a finding of fact).
35. A finding of fact by the jury is governed by the Seventh Amendment's
reexamination clause, which places limits on the form of appellate review.
See, e.g., Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 432-39 (1996).
Insofar as these limitations affect the type of due process constraints that can
be imposed on a tort practice, there may be a relevant constitutional difference
between forms of tort liability depending upon whether the liability is based
upon a finding of fact by the jury.
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damages you fix must be just and reasonable in the light of
the evidence.
[This is non-economic damage.]
[If you conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to recover
compensation for future non-economic damages, you
should determine that amount in current dollars, that is, the
amount paid at the time of judgment that will compensate a
plaintiff for future pain and suffering. The method you use
in determining future economic losses need not be followed
by you in your determination of future non-economic
damages.]
36
These instructions give jurors very little guidance on how to
calculate the damages award. The absence of well-defined standards
for determining pain and suffering damages is well known. The
amount of discretion given to juries on the matter largely explains
why such damages have been and continue to be a focal point in the
debate over tort reform. For example, the United States Department
of Justice Tort Policy Working Group recommended in 1986 that
caps be placed on pain and suffering awards because they are
subjective, unpredictable, and substantial.37 These same concerns
led a large number of states to enact legislative reforms in the 1980s
to limit pain and suffering awards.38 Perhaps the most striking
example of this concern is provided by the tort reform bill passed by
the United States House of Representatives in March 1995.39 Title II
of the bill, which caps pain and suffering damages in any health-care
liability action and eliminates joint and several liability for
noneconomic losses in all tort suits, is called "Limitation on
Speculative and Arbitrary Damage Awards. 4 °
This concern about pain and suffering damages has empirical
support. Studies have found that plaintiffs who suffer more severe
36. BAJI, supra note 29, 14.13.
37. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP
ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS
IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 66-69 (1986).
38. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 166-67
(Ala. 1991) (explaining legislative history of statutory cap).
39. H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
40. Id. at Title II, §§ 202, 203.
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injuries tend to receive higher awards, indicating some degree of
"vertical equity."4' However, plaintiffs with similar pain and
suffering injuries are often awarded significantly different amounts
of damages, indicating a lack of "horizontal equity." 42  The tort
system currently achieves some degree of vertical equity because
jurors either intuitively understand or are told to consider the severity
of injury in calculating the award. The system fails to achieve
horizontal equity because jurors are given no guidance on how to
translate injury severity into an appropriate monetary amount.
Different methods will produce different awards for the same type of
injury, resulting in a large degree of variation within each injury
category.43
As others have already recognized, any constitutional concerns
regarding the amount of jury discretion in the award of punitive
damages apply to awards for pain and suffering injuries.44 Even the
41. See, e.g., AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY
POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS 56-57 (1985); Randall
R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and
Suffering, " 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 923 (1989) (finding that severity of injury
explains about forty percent of variation); Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh,
Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation System
Fair?, 24 LAW & Soc'y REV. 997, 1007-08 (1990); Mark I. Taragin et al., The
Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on the Resolution of
Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 780, 781 (1992);
W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases: Systematic
Compensation or Capricious Awards?, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 203, 213
(1988) (describing study of over 10,000 products liability claims closed by 23
insurance companies between mid-1976 and mid-1977).
42. For citation to various empirical studies that reach this conclusion, see
Bovbjerg et al., supra note 41, at 919-2 1.
43. For example, the jury might determine the tort award by considering
how much money the plaintiff would accept in order to suffer the injury in
question. That award would differ dramatically from a determination that
somehow accounts for the fact that the defendant accidentally caused the harm.
See Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for
Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 775, 843-52 (1995) (showing how the determination of pain and
suffering damages depends upon the probability of injury).
44. See Paul DeCamp, Beyond State Farm: Due Process Constraints on
Noneconomic Compensatory Damages, 27 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 231
(2003); Robert E. Riggs, Constitutionalizing Due Process: The Limits of Due
Process, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 859, 907-08 (1991); see also 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 377 (2001) ("The claim of pain is therefore a serious threat to
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Court has recognized that punitive damages involve an amount of
discretion no greater than that which juries exercise with respect to
the determination of pain and suffering damages and the
requirements of reasonable care.45
Vague jury instructions pose a due process concern by giving
jurors an unreasonable opportunity to base their determinations on
extralegal factors like bias or prejudice. Empirical studies have
found that extralegal factors such as gender, race, socioeconomic
status, or physical appearance become more influential in jury
decisionmaking when the legal standards are the most ambiguous. 46
Insofar as juries have a similar amount of discretion in determining
punitive damages, pain and suffering damages, and the requirements
of reasonable care, it follows that the possibility of bias applies
equally to all three issues. This constitutional concern is generated
by vague jury instructions and is not plausibly limited to punitive
damages.
C. The Third Constitutional Concern: Fair Notice
Due process requires that individuals be given fair notice of
what is required of them by the law, enabling the Court in State
Farm to identify another constitutional concern posed by punitive
damages:
[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to classify
arbitrariness as a virtue. Indeed, the point of due process-
the defendant since, lacking any objective components, it permits juries to
roam through their biases in setting an award.").
45. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20 ("The discretion
allowed under Alabama law in determining punitive damages is no greater than
that pursued in many familiar areas of the law as, for example, deciding...'reasonable care,' .. or appropriate compensation for pain and suffering or
mental anguish.")..
46. See, e.g., Martin F. Kaplan & Charles E. Miller, Group Decision
Making and Normative Versus Informational Influence: Effects of Type of
Issue and Assigned Decision Rule, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 306,
310 (1987) (describing study showing that juror discussions regarding punitive
damages are more likely to involve normative, value-laden judgments than
references to the evidence presented at trial). For a survey of this literature,
see Frederick S. Levin, Note, Pain and Suffering Guidelines: A Cure for
Damages Measurement "Anomie," 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 303, 321 &
nn.63-68 (1989).
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of the law in general-is to allow citizens to order their
behavior. A State can have no legitimate interest in
deliberately making the law so arbitrary that citizens will be
unable to avoid punishment based solely upon bias or
whim.
47
This constitutional concern further limits the way in which
punitive damages can promote general deterrence. When tort rules
are vaguely specified, the associated uncertainty usually increases
the incentive to exercise care, thereby promoting general
deterrence. 4 8  In this passage, the Court expressly rejects such a
rationale for vague liability rules.49 The state's interest in general
deterrence does not justify overly vague legal standards, because
such standards do not fairly enable individuals to determine what the
law requires of them.
The problem of vague tort rules is not limited to punitive
damages, nor is this constitutional concern limited to tort issues
decided by juries. Any issue that is decided by judges as a matter of
law would pose the identical problem for defendants if the governing
legal standard were so vague as to make it unfairly difficult for
citizens to order their behavior.
Consider the threshold tort question of whether duty exists in
any given case. Modem torts jurisprudence has tended to devalue
the analytics of duty, treating duty as "a shorthand statement of a
conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself.",50 Duty depends
47. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417-18
(2003) (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
48. See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 79-83 (explaining why uncertainty
regarding the standard of care leads to the general consequence in which
parties "will tend to be led to take more than due care"); Id. at 131-32
(explaining why actors ordinarily will have an incentive to take too much care
only when courts systematically overestimate damages as a result of
uncertainty).
49. The passage quotes from a dissenting opinion by Justice O'Connor,
who in turn was responding to an argument that "to best advance the State's
interest in deterrence, juries must be given unbridled discretion to render
awards that are widely unpredictable." Haslip, 499 U.S. at 59 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
50. KEETON ET AL., supra note 34, § 53, at 358. For a good discussion of
the modem approach to duty questions, see John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, The Moral ofMacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1733 (1998).
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on various factors that have been identified by the courts, but these
"factors are so numerous and so broadly stated that they can lead to
almost any conclusion." 51  Consequently, "no universal test for
[duty] ever has been formulated .... There is little analysis of the
problem of duty in the courts."
52
If the existence of duty is effectively announced by the court
rather than being the predictable result of legal analysis, on what
basis can citizens determine whether they will be subject to a tort
duty in situations not previously addressed by the case law?
A similar problem arises with respect to the rule of strict liability
for abnormally dangerous activities, another issue decided by judges
as a matter of law.51 Whether an activity is governed by this rule of
strict liability depends upon six factors under the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.54 These factors "are all to be considered, and are
all of importance." 55  No one factor, however, is "necessarily
sufficient of itself.in a particular case, and ordinarily several of them
will be required for strict liability. On the other hand, it is not
necessary that each of them be present, especially if the others weigh
heavily., 56 Other than these vague instructions, the tort rule gives
judges no guidance on how to apply the rule.57 Given the absence of
guidance for judges, it logically follows that the rule also does not
provide appropriate guidance to citizens.
Insofar as vague tort rules pose a due process concern by
making it unreasonably difficult for citizens to order their behavior,
the concern is not limited to punitive damages or even to issues
resolved by the jury. Other important tort rules create the same
constitutional concern.
51. DOBBS, supra note 44, § 226, at 583 (2000).
52. KEETON ET AL., supra note 34, § 53, at 358.
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f(1977).
54. Id. § 519.
55. Id. § 520 cmt. f.
56. Id.
57. See George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DuKE L.J. 747,
768-69 (1986) (showing how "[a]n enormous range of legal decisions could all
be plausibly justified" under the rule).
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D. The Fourth Constitutional Concern: Poor Decisionmaking
Vague jury instructions can pose another constitutional concern
as the Court in State Farm explains:
Our concerns are heightened when the decisionmaker is
presented . . with evidence that has little bearing as to the
amount of punitive damages that should be awarded.
Vague instructions, or those that merely inform the jury to
avoid "passion or prejudice," do little to aid the
decisionmaker in its task of assigning appropriate weight to
evidence that is relevant and evidence that is tangential or
only inflammatory.58
This final due process concern essentially restates the problems
posed by overly vague tort rules. The problem of vagueness cannot
be eliminated by instructing the jury to avoid "passion or prejudice"
in awarding punitive damages. So too, the problem cannot be
eliminated by instructing jurors to exercise their "authority with calm
and reasonable judgment" in determining pain and suffering
damages. 59 Whether the decisionmaker is a juror or judge, the need
to resolve an issue without sufficient guidance from the law
predictably leads to decisions that are not based upon an appropriate
weighing of the evidence. Unable to discern the appropriate
relevance of evidence, the decisionmaker is also disabled from
distinguishing relevant evidence from "evidence that is tangential or
only inflammatory."
Poor decisions presumably increase the likelihood of erroneous
impositions of liability, which in turn increase the likelihood that
liability involves an unreasonable deprivation of the defendant's
property in violation of due process. This constitutional concern
need not have anything to do with the motives or character of the
decisionmaker, but is an inevitable product of vague legal rules.
58. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003)
(quoting Appeal to Pet. for Cert. 108a-109a).
59. BAJI,supra note 29, 14.13.
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II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF DUE PROCESS FOR TORT REFORM
Writing at a time before the Court adopted any express due
process constraints on punitive damages, Professor Robert Riggs
observed:
[I]t is hard to see how the typical instructions in a punitive
damages case can be held to violate due process (by leaving
the jury with "unbridled discretion") without also putting in
doubt the large bodies of tort law that equally rely upon
such subjective concepts as negligence, gross negligence,
malice, or conduct that is reckless, wanton, willful and
malicious. If due process is to remake the law of punitive
damages by finding these widely used concepts
constitutionally infirm, it logically cannot stop until it has
changed the whole face of tort law, and perhaps the rest of
the law as well.6 °
In an important respect, this prediction has been borne out. The
constitutional concerns the Court has relied upon to justify due
process constraints on punitive damages also justify constraining
other areas of tort law, an outcome that has been identified and
decried by Justices Scalia and Thomas. It is an open question,
though, whether constitutional tort reform will change "the whole
face of tort law."
To evaluate this question, we can consider the impact that due
process has had on tort practices regarding punitive damages. Under
the common law, an award of punitive damages serves the purposes
of punishment and deterrence.62 A wide range of awards would
serve these purposes. Punitive damages of $1 million would punish
and deter the defendant, and $2 million would provide even more
punishment and deterrence. Due to the wide range of awards that
would satisfy the common-law requirements for punitive damages,
the practice generated a considerable amount of legal uncertainty.
This uncertainty underlies the various constitutional concerns that the
Court has relied upon to impose due process constraints on punitive
damages. These constraints require a court to evaluate a punitive
60. Riggs, supra note 44, at 897-98.
61. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 606-07 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting joined by Thomas, J.).
62. See id. at 568.
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damages award in terms of three factors: "(1) the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity
between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the
punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive
damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable cases."
63
These factors or "guideposts" adopt the common-law objectives
of punishment and deterrence and then refine the open-ended
common-law inquiry in order to ensure that any given award does
not unreasonably exceed the amount required for purposes of
punishment and deterrence. The due process inquiry takes this form
because it "appropriately begins with an identification of the state
interests that a punitive award is designed to serve."64 By adopting
the substantive objectives or purposes to be served by tort liability,
constitutional tort reform will not necessarily change the "whole face
of tort law." Any constitutionally mandated change should only
constrain the way in which the tort system functions or attempts to
achieve its substantive purposes-the state interests that are
supposed to be furthered by tort liability.
Due to this constitutional objective, the Court has tried to avoid
taking a position on the appropriate purpose of punitive damages,
instead deferring to the substantive purposes expressed by the
practice in question.65 In Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool
Group, for example, the Court was confronted by an argument that
the amount of punitive damages for purposes of economically
optimal deterrence is "a 'fact' found by the jury and that, as a result,
the Seventh Amendment is implicated in appellate review of that
award.",66 In addressing this argument, the Court looked to the
purpose of punitive damages as expressed by the jury instructions in
question, finding that "deterrence was but one of four concerns the
jury was instructed to consider when setting the amount of punitive
damages. Moreover, it is not at all obvious that even the deterrent
function of punitive damages can be served only by economically
63. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418.
64. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568.
65. DeCamp, supra note 44, at 268.
66. 532 U.S. 424, 438 (2001).
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'optimal deterrence."' 67  The Court accordingly decided the
constitutional question while trying to sidestep the substantive
question about the appropriate purpose of punitive damages.
Notwithstanding the Court's efforts in this regard, constitutional
tort reform will often have an impact on the substantive objectives of
tort law. For example, in adopting the criteria for determining
whether a punitive damages award satisfies due process, the Court
has tried to accept the substantive purposes of punitive damages
while ensuring that any given award does not exceed the amount
required for these purposes. Nevertheless, the Court's rulings have
affected the substantive purposes served by punitive damages.
As previously discussed, in adopting the criteria for evaluating
the constitutionality of a punitive damages award, the Court has
implicitly assumed that punitive damages serve the purposes of
retribution for a private wrong and individual deterrence of the
defendant. 68 There is widespread agreement that any punishment
afforded by punitive damages is properly limited to the wrongdoing
the defendant inflicted upon the plaintiff.69 There is not widespread
agreement, though, about the type of deterrence that should be
promoted by a punitive award. Must it be specific to the defendant
or generally directed to the public? The answer to this question will
depend upon a substantive, contestable conception of tort liability.
According to a widely held understanding of tort law, tort
liability serves the two functions of compensating the individual
plaintiff while creating incentives for general deterrence. 7' Within
this conception of tort liability, punitive damages serve the objectives
of both general deterrence and individual deterrence.
7 1
Consequently, punitive damages play a "mixed" role of private
punishment and general deterrence, but that role is no different than
67. Id. at 439.
68. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal
Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 359 (2003) ("The prevailing justification for
punitive damages is individually oriented, retributive punishment.").
70. See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO L.J.
513,522-31 (2003).
71. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979) (stating
that punitive damages are "awarded against a person.., to deter him and
others like him from similar conduct in the future") (emphasis added).
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the "mixed" way in which compensatory damages provide private
compensation and general deterrence. By effectively limiting the
purpose of punitive damages to individual or specific deterrence, the
Court has relied upon a conception of tort liability that is not widely
shared.72
As long as the substantive purposes of tort law remain
contentious, any due process constraint on a tort practice is likely to
rely upon a contestable conception of tort liability. 73 Constitutional
tort reform will inevitably have an impact on the substantive
objectives of tort law.
This outcome does not necessarily mean that constitutional tort
reform is misguided. As the Court has said, the due process inquiry
"appropriately begins with an identification of the state interests that
a punitive award is designed to serve." 74 The states determine the
interests to be served by the tort practice in question. If the Court
adopts due process constraints that implicitly rely upon an erroneous
substantive conception of tort liability, the states are free to adopt a
different substantive conception. Constitutional tort reform can
serve the valuable role of forcing state courts and legislatures to
identify more clearly the substantive objectives of tort liability.
For example, the Court's opinion in State Farm may only
require that punitive damages be calculated in a manner that does not
expose the defendant to future liability for the same injuries caused
by the misconduct. 75 Liability in these circumstances is excessive,
resulting in the violation of substantive due process. Consequently,
72. In particular, the Court's linkage of punishment and specific deterrence
relies upon the form of justification required by corrective justice, which
maintains that "[i]n specifying the nature of the injustice, the only normative
factors to be considered significant are those that apply correlatively to both
parties .... thus allowing tort law to function as a coherent enterprise in
justification rather than as a hodgepodge of factors separately relevant only to
one or the other of the parties." Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective
Justice, 50 UCLA L. REV. 621, 626-27 (2002) (sentence structure omitted).
73. Thus, for example, the Court's decision that the jury determination of
punitive damages is not a "finding of fact" for purposes of appellate review
also relies upon a contentious conception of punitive damages. See Anthony J.
Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do? Why Misunderstanding the History
of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 CHI. KENT L. REV. 163 (2003).
74. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
75. See Sharkey, supra note 69, at 359-63.
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as long as a method for awarding punitive damages does not lead to
outcomes that "might... 'double count' by including in the punitive
damages award some of the compensatory, or punitive, damages that
subsequent plaintiffs would also recover,"7 6 the resultant awards
should satisfy due process. Punitive damages based upon individual
retribution and individual deterrence clearly satisfy this requirement,
but a properly formulated method for determining punitive damages
also ensures that such damages can serve general deterrence without
involving any "double counting." 77 Hence State Farm should give
states the option to pursue general deterrence as long as that purpose
is explicit and implemented by the appropriate procedures. The
availability of such an option directly follows from the principle that
constitutional tort reform is supposed to accept the substantive
objectives or purposes to be served by tort liability.
Once constitutional tort reform is placed within this broader
dynamic, its role becomes appealing. Insofar as the vagueness of tort
rules stems from vagueness about the underlying purpose of tort
liability, constitutional tort reform is likely to be based upon a
contentious conception of tort liability. If that substantive outcome
is unacceptable for a state, it retains the option of adopting a different
conception of tort liability that may require a different set of due
process constraints. The dynamic of constitutional tort reform has
the potential to "change the face of tort law" by forcing the states to
clarify the substantive aims of tort liability.
III. CONCLUSION
Constitutional tort reform can be usefully compared to earlier
tort reform movements, which have largely involved the expansion
and subsequent contraction of tort liability. These earlier reforms
have had differing distributive impacts on right-holders and duty-
holders, whereas constitutional tort reform has the potential to
benefit everyone. This distributive difference can be illustrated by
product cases.
76. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v, Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003)
(quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 593 (1996) (Breyer, J.,
concurring)).
77. See generally Sharky, supra note 69 (proposing such a scheme).
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During most of the twentieth century, the expansion of tort
liability for defective products probably increased product safety,
thereby benefiting consumers. 78 The increased liability also
increased costs for manufacturers, and the resultant increases in
product price have been detrimental to consumers. Whether the
expansion in tort liability has conferred a net benefit on consumers is
an open question. What is clear, though, is that the increased product
prices have presumably reduced aggregate demand and corporate
profits. The expansion of tort liability has apparently been
detrimental for product sellers (the duty-holders) while having an
ambiguous impact on consumers (the right-holders).
By contrast, the tort reforms of the past few decades have
typically reduced the scope of liability, presumably creating the
converse effects of reducing product safety and price, all else being
equal. Perhaps the increased number of product accidents have cost
consumers less than the savings they have derived from the reduction
of product prices. Perhaps not. Regardless of the impact on
consumers, tort reforms that reduce the scope of products liability are
likely to increase aggregate product demand and corporate profits.
The reduction of tort liability has apparently been beneficial for
product sellers (the duty-holders) while having an ambiguous impact
on consumers (the right-holders).
Outside of the products context, the differing distributive
impacts of reforms are more stark. Reductions in the scope of
liability benefit duty-holders at the expense of right-holders, while
the converse holds true for expansions of liability. In light of these
differing distributive impacts, the interest-group dynamics become
predictable and largely explain why legislative tort reform has
typically involved the scope of liability.
79
This reform dynamic has failed to address the vagueness
inherent in many important liability rules. Again, products liability
provides a good illustration. The liability rules governing product
design and product warnings have enormous practical significance,
78. The reasoning behind this conclusion and the others described in this
paragraph is described more fully in Mark Geistfeld, The Political Economy of
Neocontractual Proposals for Products Liability Reform, 72 TEX. L. REV. 803,
834-36 (1994).
79. See id.
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as any finding of defect renders the entire product line defective.
Nevertheless, the liability rules governing product designs and
warnings are unacceptably vague.
After extensively studying the case law, Professors James A.
Henderson, Jr., and Aaron Twerski, the Reporters of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, have concluded that:
[N]egligence doctrine in the context of failure-to-warn
litigation is little more than an empty shell. In most cases,
the elements of the warnings cause of action require
plaintiffs to do little more than mouth empty phrases. From
the plaintiffs perspective, there is undoubtedly a certain
attractiveness to a tort without a meaningful standard of
care or any serious requirement of proving causation. From
a broader social perspective, however, such a tort is too
lawless to be fair or useful.80
Matters are not much better with respect to the liability rules
governing product design. The appropriate definition of a design
defect has long vexed the courts, with most jurisdictions adopting the
risk-utility test.8 1 Despite the apparent consensus on this issue, on
the basis of a national survey Professor David Owen has reached the
following conclusions about how courts define the risk-utility test:
First, there is no single clearly accepted view as to how the
design defect balancing test should be described or
formulated. A related finding is that there is considerable
variation in how the balancing test is formulated among the
states, among decisions within the same state, and often
even within the same judicial opinion. Another finding is
that courts today quite typically cobble together a variety of
separate and often conflicting formulations of balancing
tests borrowed, without analysis, from earlier opinions.
Further, many courts acknowledge that a variety of factors
should be balanced but neither discriminate between the
80. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in
Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv.
265, 326 (1990).
81. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 2, Reporters' Note cmt. d (1997).
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various factors nor explain how they should be balanced or
otherwise interrelate.
82
The vague liability rules governing defective product designs
and warnings would seem to pose a distinct problem of due process.
These rules govern the conduct of manufacturers in national product
markets, and the vagueness and variability in the rules raise due
process concerns that are not qualitatively different from those posed
by punitive damages.
83
Unlike the tort reforms that have reduced or expanded the scope
of liability for defective designs and warnings, constitutional tort
reform has a much greater likelihood of benefiting both consumers
and manufacturers. For any given level of desired product safety, a
reduction in legal uncertainty will reduce the cost of liability
insurance for manufacturers. 84  Reforms of this type enable
manufacturers to provide the amount of desired product safety at
lower cost. The reduction in product prices benefits consumers, and
the resultant increase in aggregate demand should benefit
manufacturers. By reducing the legal uncertainty generated by
products liability rules, constitutional tort reform can confer a more
widespread distribution of benefits than reforms that contract or
expand the scope of liability.
The process of constitutional tort reform is also likely to affect
the substantive content of the liability rules. Any substantive
changes, however, ultimately are a matter to be decided by the states
82. David G. Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing in Design Defect Cases, 30 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 239, 242 (1997).
83. See supra Part I (showing how vague rules regarding the standard of
care pose constitutional concerns greater than those posed by punitive
damages).
84. See Geistfeld, supra note 78, at 839-42 (providing various reasons why
"[i]ncreased legal uncertainty... translates into higher costs for insurance
companies even if the mean value of the loss stays constant"). For more recent
studies showing how uncertainty increases the cost of insurance, see J. David
Cummins, Catastrophic Events, Parameter Uncertainty and the Breakdown of
Implicit Long-Term Contracting: The Case of Terrorism Insurance, 26 J. RISK
& UNCERTAINTY 153 (2003); Kenneth A. Froot & Paul G.J. O'Connell, The
Pricing of US. Catastrophe Reinsurance, in THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE
RISK 195 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1999) (providing and testing model in which
the equilibrium price of insurance increases with increased volatility of the
policyholder's loss distribution due to the insurer's increased need to raise
costly, external capital).
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rather than the U.S. Supreme Court. Tort law will continue to be a
product of state law, with due process potentially providing a much
needed impetus for the implementation of reform measures that
should be in the best interests of everyone.
